Recovered Battle Report 93-2B-0
Classification: Level 3 – Limited Access
Source: Field Command Log
Codename: War Theatre
Recovery Site: Old Ruined of Eastern Mancoit Battlefront
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Filed by: Operator C-17
Verification Code: 7F3-A9X-12
Node Stamp: Eastern Continental Net - Relay 03 – [ Fragment Recovered ]
[Transcript]
Casualty Report – Eastern Front:
- Confirmed dead: ~5,893,293 personnel
- Wounded: Estimated 2–3 million personnel
Medical infrastructure is beyond capacity. Overflow cases are being treated outside medical stations without proper facilities.
We have lost air superiority due to deployment of a new enemy anti-air system. General staff have proposed a concentrated blitzkrieg assault to eliminate these defences, followed by a counteroffensive supported by artillery and precision bombardment. Risk analysis projects extremely high casualty rates should this plan be executed.
The enemy [DATA CORRUPTED]. Recommend the use of high-caliber rounds for a secure kill. EMP is ineffective but may be used to slow them down, with an estimated reboot time of approximately 10 seconds.
There are still no signs of the enemy command center. We propose sending a small squad to location [DATA CORRUPTED]. The location shows abnormal energy readings and elevated heat signatures.
Morale Assessment:
Overall troop morale is critically low. Units report widespread fatigue and resignation toward continued operations. Requests have been submitted for increased distribution of cigarettes and alcoholic beverages to maintain minimal morale levels. If permitted, limited controlled access to stronger stimulants (including cocaine or methamphetamine) is recommended to sustain combat performance.
Enemy forces display no observable fatigue and maintain continuous offensive operations. Territorial losses are incremental but consistent. Projections indicate industrial zone overrun within two months and capital breach within three months total if conditions remain unchanged.
Requests for reinforcement from allied nations remain unanswered. Intelligence suggests Yuina, Guiane Republic and Panla may already have fallen.
Recommendation:
Authorize deployment of nuclear armaments on the Eastern Front.
Relocate industrial assets to secondary facilities to preserve production capability in anticipation of continued enemy advances.
Approve morale-sustaining measures as outlined above.
End of Report.
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Archivist's Note
Analysis indicates this report was filed during the initial years of the conflict. Contextual reference to the collapse of Yuina, the Guiane Republic, and Panla in 2055 suggests authorship between 2053 and 2055, though precise dating remains inconclusive.
Cross-referenced materials implied the eventual fall of the Mancoit capital within months, the exact date remains uncertain due to conflicting or missing records. Total casualty figures from the collapse are unavailable, but estimated numbers from experts are in the tens of millions
Post-conflict assessments confirm that of the 500-kilometer Eastern Front, approximately 400 kilometers were rendered highly radioactive due to the deployment of nuclear weapons.
The battle report indicates the first recorded sighting of a new enemy type, later designated as D.A.S. units, on the Eastern Continent. Yet cross-referenced documentation from the Noafaca campaign records their widespread and standardized deployment only in 2079.
This discrepancy suggests that during the Mancoit front, D.A.S. may have only been deployed on a limited, experimental basis. Other possibilities include:
- Prototype field testing prior to mass production,
- Isolated deployment intended to assess Allied countermeasures,
- Regional variation in enemy strategy, with certain theaters receiving advanced unit types earlier than others.
The absence of consistent sightings until decades later implies that these early appearances were rare and restricted, not part of broader operational doctrine.