Notes: This section is not required for the main work, but within the framework of the "alternate" history, it notes Szarekh's influence on Earth. This part of the work is written as a historical essay. It also explains the hero's dealings with the Caribbean Legion.
1948.
March 12, 1948, marked a turning point for the countries of Latin America. Central Americans demonstrated that they were subjects of international politics, not its objects. On that day, they managed to deceive the expectations of a superpower that had seemed too slow to respond adequately. The CIA was aware of the Caribbean Legion's concentration in Costa Rica, preparing for a preemptive strike against President Rafael Calderón.
In the 1940s, Costa Rican politics was dominated by Rafael Angel Calderón, a physician who served as president from 1940 to 1944. The constitution prohibited immediate reelection, so the National Republican Party nominated Professor Teodoro Picado, considered a weak figure under Calderón's control, for the 1944 elections.
The victorious Picado administration repeatedly resorted to military force to maintain order. Calderón's supporters, often backed by the army, provoked the opposition into conflict. Costa Rica's communist movement, the Popular Vanguard Party, led by Senator Manuel Mora, supported Picado's government and contributed to the unrest, also opposing the opposition. As tensions escalated, opposition supporters began arming themselves, and police switched from beating demonstrators to threatening them with firearms.
Civil conflict and government repression of the opposition led to the "Sit-In Strike," which paralyzed Costa Rica's economy for seven days. Calderón supporters began firing workers at striking businesses, and Picado's administration threatened the strikers with dismissal and expulsion from military service. By the end of the strike, police and army units patrolled the streets of San José, turning the city into a besieged fortress.
In the 1948 elections, Calderón again ran for the ruling party. There were widespread fears that the government would interfere in the vote to ensure his victory over journalist Otilio Ulate. To allay these concerns, the Picado administration, for the first time in Costa Rica's history, transferred authority over the election to an independent electoral tribunal.
On April 12, 1942, Costa Rican businessman José Figueres Ferrer was forced into exile in Mexico after a radio broadcast in which he sharply criticized the Calderón regime. Figueres returned to Costa Rica after Picado's electoral victory. Even before the 1948 elections, he was actively planning an armed uprising. Unlike Ulate, former President León Cortés, and other opposition figures, Figueres was convinced that Calderón would never allow fair elections.
Figueres began forming the "Caribbean Legion"—2,000 well-armed rebels. The Legion planned to use Costa Rica as a springboard for attacks on other authoritarian governments in Central America. Washington watched the Legion's actions with growing alarm, especially after a series of terrorist attacks orchestrated by Figueres in Costa Rica in 1945–1946, intended to provoke a general strike. However, the population failed to heed this call.
Following an electoral campaign marked by violence and numerous irregularities, on February 8, 1948, an independent electoral tribunal, by a majority of two to one, declared the victory of opposition candidate Otilio Ulate of the National Liberation Party. The National Republican Party candidate, former President Calderón, declared the results fraudulent and petitioned Congress, where his party, in coalition with the Popular Vanguard, held a majority, to annul the results and hold new elections. When Congress granted the request, a scandal erupted, with both sides accusing the other of fraud.
On the day the government annulled the election results, police surrounded the home of Dr. Carlos Luis Valverde, where Ulata and Figueres were spotted. Shots rang out, and Valverde was killed on his doorstep. Ulata managed to escape, but was soon arrested and imprisoned.
Figueres, who had carefully prepared for such a scenario, rallied his supporters and field commanders on March 12. He then went on the radio, declaring his rejection of "terror" and declaring any communist forces attempting to seize Costa Rica as enemies. This political maneuver earned him favor with the United States. Figueres had recently met with the American ambassador, pointing out that 70% of the army and police were members of the Communist Party, citing the experience of Czechoslovakia, which became a socialist country after its police officers joined the Communist Party. Figueres received the "blessing" for the war, but the United States likely didn't fully understand the scale of his plans and ambitions. The "Caribbean Legion" turned out to be a well-armed unit, equipped with German MP-40s, armored vehicles, mortars, and even tanks. The arrival of 15 T-4 tanks came as a complete surprise to the entire region, given that the armies of Costa Rica and neighboring Nicaragua had no tanks. Using transcontinental roads, Figueres' supporters swiftly attacked government troops. They were thrown into panic, as the Costa Rican army numbered only 1,200 men and used Mauser rifles as their primary weapons. The Caribbean Legion, however, used machine guns and grenades, suppressing any resistance.
Government troops, supported by Mora's communist forces and Nicaraguan troops sent by dictator Somoza, attempted to mount a defense, but were defeated by the legion's rapid advance. By cracking radio codes, the legionnaires were aware of all enemy troop movements and delivered swift and devastating blows.
By March 16, the legion's combat units had already approached the capital, San José, after which the most devastating blow was dealt. The commanders of the Costa Rican armed forces, President Picado, Calderón, Senator Mora, and the commanders of the Nicaraguan contingent gathered for a meeting to develop a new strategy, possibly with the aim of requesting assistance from other countries. However, they were too late: at 9:15 AM, an explosion rocked their office. Everyone present was killed—Figueres's agents had succeeded where Stauffenberg had failed in 1944. Without a command structure, each unit began fighting in disarray. By the morning of March 17, after fierce fighting, the last pockets of Nicaraguan resistance surrendered, having seen three T-4 tanks fire warning shots. Figueres announced the formation of a provisional government. His next move was to send his troops to the borders with Nicaragua, as there was a real threat that Somoza would send new units to intervene without having full information about the destruction of all his allies.
Seven hundred Caribbean Legion fighters were deployed to the Nicaraguan border in three days. The United States mistakenly perceived these 250 kilometers as an attempt to "flex its muscles" against its US-backed neighbor. At the same time, the American side, through its ambassador to Costa Rica, made it clear that an attack on Nicaragua was unacceptable. The reasons for this lay in its long-standing support for the Somoza dictatorship. Most Nicaraguan officers had studied at American educational institutions, and, unlike Costa Rica, Nicaragua had its own air force. This is precisely why the American side was passive in deciding to defend its ally, not expecting its swift defeat.
At the same time, the US government and its local representatives underestimated the Latin Americans, considering them "amusing barbarians" who grew bananas and were incapable of anything more serious, including playing games with the radio. The US was well aware of the concentration of two thousand Caribbean Legion fighters in Costa Rica and constantly monitored their communications, believing they had a complete picture of the ongoing military operations. They were mistaken. During the fighting in Costa Rica, only a thousand soldiers were deployed, but through radio communications, they created the impression of a significantly larger number. Using radios, the legionnaires simulated the distribution of their forces throughout the country to maintain control. According to US intelligence agencies, only a third of the total forces dispersed throughout the country were sent to the borders of Nicaragua. Therefore, the risk of an invasion was assessed as low: the Americans believed that it would take too long to assemble all the forces, and they would have time to intervene to "put the presumptuous barbarians in their place."
On March 21, the United States regretted its carelessness. At 4:30 a.m., a transport ship entered the Dominican Republic port, significantly delayed due to an engine problem that the crew repaired. At that moment, dozens of shots rang out across the city: the presidential residence, barracks, airfield, and several houses housing army and police officers were blown up. The command was instantly decapitated. From the very ship that had entered the port, combat forces of the Caribbean Legion began to disembark under the command of Juan Bosch, an active participant in the planning of the liberation of the Dominican Republic from dictator Trujillo in 1947. That plan failed because, with the help of the United States, Trujillo managed to bribe a Cuban general, who completely disarmed the Caribbean Legion units, who intended to use Cuba as a springboard to seize power in the Dominican Republic. The plan was to land in Haiti and then attack Trujillo's forces through that country. However, the dictator prevented such an attack through political decisions. Bosch managed to escape, then resurfaced as part of a legion seeking to liberate Costa Rica, recruiting many of the men who had participated in the first attempt to liberate the Dominican Republic. However, he shared his plans with no one. As soon as Fegueris's advance units advanced, Bosch confiscated all means of communication from his men and informed them of a plan to liberate the Dominican Republic. If the men did not agree to such a risk, they could remain in camp, albeit under guard. The soldiers were initially quite shocked, but when they learned that Bosch had acquired allies capable of ensuring a number of conditions for victory, most agreed.
Boats resembling Viking longships delivered them to a ship in the middle of the sea. There, a captive crew and countless crates of various weapons awaited them. No one else was there—no allies, no trace. The unknown agents who had provided the longships, so unusual for these waters, had vanished without a trace. Bosch, apologizing to the crew, loaded them onto the longship, giving each man five thousand dollars in compensation. Then, after examining the loot, the soldiers realized: such an arsenal would be enough to conquer almost the entire Caribbean. The crates contained German submachine guns, machine guns, grenades, and mortars. Given the recent end of World War II, this suggested that the "Caribbean Legion" had found the same suppliers as Israel (for more on this, see the article "The Influence of Arms Dealers in the Arab-Israeli War"). The cargo ship itself, if not for the planned explosions, would have provided a safe escape route. Any attempt by Dominican Republic patrol vessels to block their passage would have been thwarted by German anti-aircraft fire. Numerous suspicions that the ship was originally intended to transport military supplies were dismissed by the oaths of the Panama Canal authorities. An investigation might have shed light, but the working theory was that unknown assailants had seized the ship, knocked out the crew, and transferred it from another vessel carrying weapons to the ship's harbor.
Several hours earlier, five hundred legionnaires, crossing the border with Nicaragua, reached Lake Nicaragua. Drakkars were already waiting for them there, and they disembarked at 4:30 AM in the city of Granada. At that very moment, a wave of explosions swept across Nicaragua. The targets were the same – the government, the military, the weapons depots. The Nicaraguan forces, however, were on guard: troops comparable in size to the legion were waiting for them at the border. The main forces, however, were concentrated in the capital, Managua. At 4:30 AM, the legion's remaining tank and artillery crews at the border launched a surprise attack. Using intelligence, they accurately calculated the positions of the mortars and delivered a crushing blow. This was merely a diversionary maneuver. Two hundred legionnaires, armed with fifty machine guns, were to hold the defense and draw the main enemy forces.
The balance of power in those years was intriguing. The Caribbean Legion numbered 2,000 bayonets, while Costa Rican forces numbered 1,200 fighters, not counting the communist Moro units. Nicaragua's armed forces numbered 3,000 men, 300 of whom were killed or captured during the operation in Costa Rica. The Dominican Republic possessed the largest army in the region—12,000 men and 15 aircraft. However, these forces were scattered throughout the Dominican portion of Haiti. Having lost their command structure, many units panicked. Some didn't even realize they were under attack—this applied to both Nicaragua and the Dominican Republic. The forces that landed in Guiana City declared themselves the country's liberators from dictatorship, offering a reward in US dollars for transport. Whether driven by revolutionary fervor or greed, the legionnaires got what they wanted. They managed to cover the 15 kilometers separating the two closest towns in just half an hour. By 6 a.m., the legionnaires were already in Masaya, halfway to the capital. Meanwhile, chaos reigned in Managua: people were putting out fires, seeking orders, trying to figure out who was in charge and how. By 4:30 a.m., the Nicaraguan army units in the capital had effectively ceased to exist as an organized force. Panic reigned, ammunition was running low. And they still had no idea what was happening or who their enemy was. The commander, fighting at the border with two hundred legionnaires, had no idea of the scale of events. His goal was to prevent the legion from advancing along the transcontinental road, while they were staging attacks, actively using tanks and mortars. Their first strike claimed the lives of 30 Nicaraguan soldiers. Over the course of the day, 120 people were killed, and another 164 were wounded.
Legion units entered the capital at 7:01 a.m., catching the remaining garrison by surprise—they were busy putting out fires and completely unprepared for battle. Most of the soldiers surrendered. Those officers who attempted to organize resistance were quickly eliminated. The world remained in the dark: embassies in Nicaragua were unable to contact their governments due to a radio failure. It was suspected that this was the work of an underground organization facilitating the entire operation. Not a single ambassador was able to report what was happening. The American ambassador was the most alarmed; he even demanded a meeting with the commander of the invasion forces. He was refused, citing a busy schedule. The legionnaires' first act was to free political prisoners and occupy key government buildings. Then the legionnaires pulled out another trump card—airpower. Two Junkers 87 attack aircraft, piloted by German mercenaries, began attacking Nicaraguan troops, causing confusion in their defenses. This proved decisive in forcing the border contingent to surrender. The legionnaires, acting in accordance with the Geneva Convention, treated prisoners mercifully and treated the wounded. The way was clear for a further offensive. The very next day, troops began to seize southern Nicaragua.
Events in the Dominican Republic unfolded in a completely different manner. After a series of similarly designed explosions, fires and panic broke out in the city. Legion soldiers took advantage of this, seized the port, and rapidly advanced through the city. Despite being outnumbered, they showed no mercy to the panicking soldiers of the Trujillo regime. The fighting was swift and bloody. Within five hours, the capital of the Dominican Republic, Santo Domingo, was captured. Bosch announced the formation of a provisional government, intended to serve as a transitional one before democratic elections. He also declared that any government troops who did not surrender would be mercilessly destroyed for their crimes against their own people.
Unlike Nicaragua, reports of events in the Dominican Republic reached the US government in a timely manner. While President Truman pondered the situation, it deteriorated sharply. Trujillo's death was confirmed. Bosch, through the US ambassador, proposed that the US not intervene, guaranteeing the absence of communism in the Dominican Republic. Otherwise, the US would have to send troops to the island and rebuild Trujillo's devastated army. This would have been difficult and would have required colossal investments. Although the Americans could afford it, from a simple cost-benefit standpoint, it was more profitable to conserve these resources for the fight against communism. While negotiations were underway, legionnaire detachments located and destroyed Dominican army forces. Some conspiracy theorists suggest that such an operation could not have been carried out without satellite reconnaissance, similar to what they believe occurred during the Arab-Israeli conflict. But Bosch accomplished his mission, actively delaying negotiations with the United States while his troops destroyed the enemy. The legionnaires were joined by local residents eager to overthrow the repressive machine. Given the superior equipment of the Caribbean Legion compared to government forces, the outcome was predictable.
On the second day of negotiations, the US learned of the collapse of the dictatorship in Nicaragua. Moreover, from Guatemala, Legion forces entered El Salvador, where Salvadoran legionnaires overthrew the military dictator and also announced the formation of a provisional government pending elections. Ultimately, the situation became clear. Knowing that the CIA was monitoring the Caribbean Legion, its leaders began preparing for war, targeting Costa Rica. All fighters were informed about Costa Rica, and supplies for a long war were stockpiled. The US did not object, fearing a communist takeover in that country. The CIA did not expect the Legion to possess an intelligence network capable of supporting such a level of attacks on major military bases, prepared by the Americans themselves. What unfolded was a blitzkrieg that no one expected from the "stupid Latinos." Quick decisions were needed because, in the context of a blitzkrieg, any "legitimate" governments whose return could be supported quickly disappeared. Military intervention would have required the participation of at least four countries, which the United States could not afford. Convening the UN or the OAS would have been time-consuming, and, familiar with bureaucratic red tape, the Caribbean Legion achieved results through decisive action. Within a week, the Dominican troops, constantly trained by American instructors, ceased to exist. The Legionnaires were particularly fond of night attacks. With complete situational awareness, they would strike sleeping or resting loyalist units and then move on. By the time the United States had developed a solution, it was already irrelevant, for example, because any "legitimate" ruler they envisaged quickly perished. As a result of the operation, the Truman administration decided not to expend too much effort on Latin America, increasing the CIA budget to monitor the Caribbean Legion. However, the threat did not pose a great danger: any rebellious governments would be quickly overthrown.
However, even half a century later, many questions remain unanswered. The source of the German weapons at the Caribbean Legion's disposal is unknown, and no evidence remains of the reconnaissance and sabotage network that ensured the swift victory. Theories abound, beginning with the involvement of mercenaries from Brandenburg 800, but the truth has been lost to time. The operation's leaders, Figueres and Bosch, responded vaguely to questions, declaring that it was best not to reveal their cards prematurely, lest the enemy have time to prepare countermeasures.
At that time, Guatemala, El Salvador, Costa Rica, Nicaragua, and the Dominican Republic maintained close friendly and economic ties. United by a desire for economic development, these countries chose the path of industrialization, actively purchasing machinery, machine tools, and equipment in an attempt to escape their dependence on agriculture.
The rise to power of President Arbenz in Guatemala, elected in fair elections, was a turning point for all of Latin America. Having defeated a pro-American candidate, Arbenz embarked on an independent policy, successfully ushering in a true industrial revolution in his country. The US misinterpreted the massive investments in machine tools worldwide as pro-communist, though in fact this was not the case.
On June 17, 1952, the Arbenz government passed Decree No. 900, implementing agrarian reform that allowed for the nationalization of agricultural land. At the time, the largest landowner in the country was the American company United Fruit Company, which owned 400,000 acres, 175,000 of which remained uncultivated.
In March 1953, the Guatemalan government nationalized 219,159 acres of uncultivated land belonging to United Fruit, paying the company 627,572 quetzals in compensation. In February 1954, another 173,190 acres were nationalized, with compensation of 557,542 quetzals. Thus, the government purchased the company's lands at $2.86 per acre, while according to United Fruit's inventory books, their value was only $1.48. The low appraised value was explained by the terms of the 1901 agreement, under which the lands were leased for 99 years under preferential terms and were exempt from most taxes.
Representatives of United Fruit expressed strong protest. Despite the fact that the reform did not affect private property interests and the nationalization was carried out on a buyout basis, the company's management and the US government reacted extremely negatively. On April 20, 1954, the US State Department officially demanded that Guatemala compensate United Fruit in the amount of $15.855 million "in connection with the expropriation of the company's land," rejecting Guatemala's offer of $594,000. On May 24, 1954, the Guatemalan government rejected these demands.
Agrarian reform was the most ambitious project in Arbenz's program. The bill was developed with the assistance of consultants, including Fortuny and other leaders of the Communist Party (restored in 1949 and officially registered in 1952 as the Guatemalan Party of Labor), as well as non-communist economists. Arbenz also sought advice from economists from other Latin American countries. Decree 900, passed by the National Assembly on June 17, 1952, went into effect immediately. A key element of the program was the transfer of uncultivated land from large landowners to landless peasants. Arbenz hoped that the reform would serve as the basis for accumulating the capital necessary for infrastructure development. Despite the World Bank's refusal to provide a loan in 1951 (at the request of the United States), Arbenz found a way out by financing the program with the country's foreign exchange reserves.
According to the law, all uncultivated land on estates over 673 acres (272 hectares) was subject to confiscation. For estates between 672 and 224 acres, confiscation applied only to those uncultivated lands where less than two-thirds of the land was actually cultivated. Estate owners received compensation in the form of government bonds, the denomination of which corresponded to the area of expropriated land. Land redistribution for the benefit of the poor was carried out by local committees consisting of representatives of landowners, peasants, and the government. Of nearly 350,000 private landholdings, only 1,710 were affected by expropriation. The law itself, while remaining within the bounds of moderate capitalism, was implemented so rapidly that arbitrary land seizures and acts of violence against landowners and wealthy peasants periodically occurred, with police investigations underway.
By June 1954, 1.4 million acres of land had been expropriated and distributed. Approximately 500,000 people, or one-sixth of the population, received land. The law also guaranteed financial credit for the new landowners. The National Agrarian Bank (BNA) was established on July 7, 1953. 53,829 applicants received an average of US$500, four times the Guatemalan per capita income. The bank earned a reputation for being highly efficient, and the US government, Árbenz's main adversary, found no reason to criticize its performance. The loan repayment rate was high: by June 1954, $6,049,092 had been repaid. The law also provided for the nationalization of roads that passed through redistributed land, significantly improving transportation accessibility for rural communities.
Contrary to the predictions of government opponents, the law even contributed to a modest increase in agricultural productivity in Guatemala, expanding the area under cultivation and boosting the purchase of agricultural machinery. Overall, the law significantly improved the standard of living of thousands of farming families, most of whom were indigenous.
The project was closely monitored by other Central American countries, many of which were considering implementing it in their own countries. These trends inevitably influenced the United Fruit Company's attitude toward the new government, which significantly limited its ability to exercise monopoly power. Social laws requiring the company to pay higher wages to workers, comply with the Labor Code, and the expropriation of land generated considerable resentment. If such legislation had spread throughout Central America, it would have been a real disaster for the company.
The United Fruit Company engaged in intense lobbying among members of the United States government, leading many American congressmen and senators to criticize the Guatemalan government. In response, the Guatemalan government claimed that the company was the main obstacle to national progress. American historians note that "Guatemalans recognized that their country was being ruthlessly exploited for foreign interests, without any contribution to the welfare of the nation." In 1953, the government expropriated 200,000 acres (81,000 ha) of uncultivated land, offering the company compensation of US$2.99 per acre, double the purchase price. This led to further lobbying in Washington, particularly through US Secretary of State John Foster Dulles, who had close ties to the company. The United Fruit Company launched a public relations campaign aimed at discrediting the Guatemalan government. A public relations team, led by Edward Bernays, was hired to portray the company as the Guatemalan government's victim. These efforts intensified after Dwight Eisenhower's election as US president in 1952. The company funded a critical study of the Guatemalan government and sent it to Washington. Historians claim the report was full of "exaggerations, offensive descriptions, and bizarre historical theories." Nevertheless, the report had significant influence on members of Congress. Overall, the company spent over half a million dollars lobbying American legislators and members of the public, calling for the overthrow of the Guatemalan government.