Actually, by now, Fan Bingbing no longer needs to rely solely on acting as her career.
In reality, Fan Bingbing has become a capital player. Not only did Barron transfer his 15% stake in Huayi Company, held through Rich23 Capital, to Fan Bingbing after she gave birth, but Tianhe Capital itself was registered in China under Fan Bingbing's name. While she doesn't actually control the company, she still has a significant say in Tianhe Film and Television's investments.
Her participation in "Succession" and the subsequent "Quantum of Solace" was also intended to elevate Fan Bingbing's international profile.
It's safe to say that she's now on a different level from ordinary celebrities.
Later, Fan Bingbing will gradually shift her role from star to investor and producer—similar to Zhao Fite's subsequent transformation, except that Fan Bingbing's background is much stronger than Zhao Fite's, and she won't resort to the same lowly capital operations she employs.
Fan Bingbing is known for her excellent interpersonal skills, or rather, her emotional intelligence. This is evident in her excellent handling of the media in the original timeline. Even after being banned for various reasons, few within the industry took offense. Instead, many owed her favors and ultimately became resources for her brother, demonstrating her excellent interpersonal skills. Even
the host who sparked the incident admitted that his focus was on the feud with Feng Kuazi and the film's partners, and that Fan Bingbing was merely dragged into it. He also acknowledged her as a very good person.
Therefore, as Barron's spokesperson for China, Fan Bingbing will focus on her strengths: acting as a "spokesperson," managing investments and nurturing relationships. As for business decisions and operational matters, she doesn't need to handle them personally; she can leave them to professionals.
Overall, Fan Bingbing's role bears similarities to Ivanta's in the United States. The difference is that Ivanta's family background affords her greater opportunities, and thus, greater responsibility within IC Capital. On August 1,
2007
, shareholders filed their first lawsuit against Bear Stearns over the plummeting performance of its hedge fund, plunging one of Wall Street's five largest investment banks into trouble.
On August 8, BNP Paribas announced that it would halt withdrawals from its money market fund investors due to the subprime mortgage crisis.
In fact, despite having long been willing to negotiate the CDO bets held by the Black Swan Fund, Goldman Sachs and Morgan Stanley remained reticent.
Goldman Sachs, on the other hand, finally reached an agreement with the Black Swan Fund on August 10. By then, Goldman Sachs's paper losses on the bets had reached $2.5 billion!
Black Swan Fund made a concession, agreeing to settle the bet with Goldman Sachs for $2 billion, finally giving Goldman Sachs a chance to cut its losses.
"I want to know, do you still have any subprime debt securities (CDS)? We'll buy a lot,"
a senior vice president told Black Swan Fund CEO Phelan O'Neill after the bet was settled.
"We have some, but you know, the price of these CDSs changes daily..."
"That's not a problem, we just want to get the deal done!"
Clearly, Goldman Sachs's stance indicated that, having cut its losses, it had turned its attention to the investment banks that had sold more subprime debt obligations (CDOs)—their former comrades...
Perhaps that's a misnomer; in finance, there's no such thing as friends.
And Phelan O'Neill was right. The price of CDS bonds did indeed change daily, sometimes even experiencing significant intraday increases.
For example, some of their CDS insurance policies were worth 0.5% when they were first purchased, but now they have risen to more than 30%...
This means that originally they only had to spend $500,000 to buy a policy with a coverage amount of $100 million (insurance for $100 million of subprime mortgages), but this policy can now be sold for 30% of $100 million, or $30 million! Of course, you could wait and claim the full $100 million from the insurance company later...
But both Phelan O'Neal and Baron understood the sheer number of these policies they held, and their total insured value, which was astronomical. Initially, due to the booming real estate market, no one believed these policies would ever see a claim, so the price they paid for them was negligible relative to the total insured value.
Even if only one-fifth, or even one-tenth, of these policies were paid, I'm afraid even the largest insurance companies would choose bankruptcy...
Therefore, it would be better to sell at the current 30% or 35% price... which would already make them a tidy profit. At least they could lock in profits and reinvest the funds in the next round of short selling.
As for why banks and investment banks like Goldman Sachs, Morgan Stanley, and UBS were willing to buy these policies?
Of course, on the one hand, their power on Wall Street is enough to get enough claims from those insurance companies. Even if they cannot honor the claims 100%, because a lot of the money they lost came from the funds they managed, this also has to be explained to their investors...
Of course, it is not just Goldman Sachs or Morgan Stanley that want to buy these insurance policies now. Almost all investment banks that have sold large amounts of subprime mortgage obligations (CDO) have begun to frantically buy those CDS, trying to make up for some losses or run faster than others.
In the words of Ferran O'Neill, what these investment banks are doing is like "a desperate attempt to buy fire insurance on a burning house."
Ultimately, the Black Swan Fund received $2 billion in compensation from Goldman Sachs for its "bet" and sold CDS insurance policies with a total payout of $10 billion at 30% of the value.
This means that the Black Swan Fund pocketed $5 billion from Goldman Sachs, while their costs were almost negligible.
Meanwhile, Goldman Sachs should be grateful; after all, the CDS policies they purchased could easily offset their losses, or even generate a profit. They were willing to offer their "sincere friendship" to the Black Swan Fund.
As for Morgan Stanley, their actions were even slower than Goldman Sachs.
It wasn't until August 19th, a week after Black Swan Fund reached an agreement with Goldman Sachs and sold its CDS, and after its bet with Black Swan Fund had already resulted in a paper loss of over $4 billion, that
they finally faced reality and settled the bet with Black Swan Fund for $3.5 billion.
At the same time, as a gesture of friendship, Black Swan Fund generously sold a $10 billion CDS insurance policy to Morgan Stanley at 35% of its value.
Under Morgan Stanley's grateful gaze, Black Swan Fund tearfully profited $7 billion.
Thus, Goldman Sachs and Morgan Stanley combined, Black Swan Fund had already pocketed $12 billion. Had this been said a year, or even six months ago, no one would have believed this.
Even so, Goldman Sachs and Morgan Stanley still had the opportunity to minimize their losses, or even profit slightly, from the CDS they purchased and the subsequent short selling.
So who lost out?