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Chapter 1291 - Chapter 1292: Forceful Takeover

Seoul, South Korea.

Monday, December 29, in the late morning, in a conference room at Samsung Group headquarters on Taiping Road in central Seoul, the final investment agreement concerning Samsung Electronics—among the three major Korean conglomerates—was signed.

One party to the agreement was a Western consortium led by the Westeros System, and the other comprised representatives of Samsung Electronics' shareholder group. The ceremony was held in strict secrecy with no journalists present; both sides had agreed that public footage might evoke memories of early 20th‑century unequal treaties forced on Asian nations by Western powers. With Korean public sentiment already tense, authorities were keen to avoid any further unrest.

The agreement's key terms involved a total investment of $3.975 billion. Based on Samsung Electronics' average stock price over the past 30 days and current exchange rates, this placed Samsung's valuation at roughly $4.7 billion. Of the $3.975 billion, $1.175 billion was allocated to purchasing approximately 25% of Samsung Electronics' existing shares from its original shareholders, while the remaining $2.8 billion was used to subscribe to a new share issuance. Once completed, five investment entities controlled by the Westeros System—through Apollo Management Company and its affiliates—would collectively hold a 53% stake in Samsung Electronics, thereby achieving absolute control.

However, according to the agreement, none of the five Westeros-controlled entities would individually hold more than 15% of the shares, while Samsung Group, via its subsidiaries, would continue to hold a total of 21%, remaining the largest public shareholder.

At 10:00 AM, immediately after the signing ceremony, the Westeros System team—led by Chen Qing—moved decisively to take over Samsung Electronics. Although on paper control would still nominally reside with the Samsung Lee family (as Simon had previously promised), the Westeros System was determined to secure its influence and operational control. In business, goodwill alone does not suffice; weak investors who relinquish power often suffer the consequences.

Over the rest of the day, following the agreement's signing, the Westeros System team, now recognized as the new controlling party of Samsung Electronics, issued a series of announcements. First, they dissolved and reorganized the Samsung Electronics board of directors. They then unveiled a new board—a nine-member team long in the making. Former Samsung Electronics President Kang Jin-chu was promoted to board chairman and continued as head of Samsung Group, effectively serving as both board chair and CEO; this arrangement was designed to reassure employees. Additionally, to placate both the staff and the Samsung Lee family, the new board included Lee Jae-yong—the 29‑year‑old sole heir of Lee Kun-hee. The remaining seven board members were all aligned with the Westeros System. Among them was one of Simon's key protégés, Jung Soo-dong—a Korean-American lawyer from McKinsey International specializing in corporate mergers and restructurings, who also served as a director at Mellon Bank in New York. Jung's appointment meant he would oversee Samsung Electronics' subsequent business restructuring. Another local asset, Jong Jung-ho, a former executive from the financial division of Hanbong Steel (which had declared bankruptcy earlier this year), joined the board as well and was appointed as chief financial officer to review and monitor Samsung Electronics' finances. The other five members, mostly former government officials or Korean university professors, were largely figureheads—receiving generous compensation to serve primarily as reliable votes.

Next, the new board moved to freeze Samsung Electronics' accounts and launch an in-depth financial audit to secure control over the company's funds. Following that, a third measure was enacted: all senior executives at or above the deputy director level, both domestically and internationally, were required to submit written performance reports within one week. In addition, within a month the new board would randomly select executives for in-person review. In plain terms, this was a demand for a public declaration of loyalty—an unmistakable signal that the regime had changed.

Coinciding with a comprehensive round of layoffs at Samsung Electronics, the new board was careful not to overreach by interfering with routine lower-level cuts; however, it made clear that top management must choose their allegiances carefully—remaining loyal to the new board rather than the Samsung Lee family. By controlling both financial resources and human capital, the Westeros System effectively secured control over the company. In practice, matters are never entirely simple, but as the old adage goes, "slow and steady wins the race," and Simon was prepared to be patient.

Meanwhile, Lee Kun-hee—eager to secure control over Kia Motors—remained silent on the Westeros System's bold declaration of control. Any enterprise with dual masters is prone to internal strife, a fact both Simon and the battle-hardened Lee Kun-hee understood well. The decision to relinquish control of Samsung Electronics in favor of focusing on Samsung Motors and Kia was a mutually understood compromise.

Later that afternoon, electronic giants under the Westeros System—such as Tingke Byal and Nokia—launched urgent negotiations with Samsung Electronics regarding first‑quarter component purchases for the coming year. Moreover, most of the $2.8 billion injected into Samsung Electronics was earmarked for its semiconductor division, funding technology research and the construction of new fabs. Although the semiconductor industry was still recovering from the deep downturn of 1996, this counter‑cyclical investment approach would later prove key to Samsung's dominance in semiconductors. By investing heavily during a market low and engaging in ruthless price wars, competitors would eventually be driven out, leaving Samsung as the unrivaled leader with pricing power to recoup early losses and eventually generate massive profits.

Meanwhile, Simon's long‑standing strategy regarding the liquid crystal display business—waiting until LG finally capitulated so that Samsung's LCD division could be spun off and merged with LG—remained on hold. Even if absolute control over Samsung were achieved, Simon would not allow this fundamentally Korean electronics giant to grow unchecked; there must always be a balance.

The day after the investment agreement between Samsung Group and the Westeros System was signed, on December 30, under pressure from the Korean government, Samsung Motors signed a memorandum of understanding to merge with Kia Motors—then under government takeover. At the signing, representatives from a Westeros-controlled consortium declared that they would provide financial support for Samsung Motors' acquisition of Kia. The announcement left Hyundai Group silent—having already reached a private understanding—while Daewoo Group reacted vehemently. Daewoo Group Chairman Kim Woo-jung even held a press conference that afternoon, publicly denouncing the authorities for handing Kia Motors over to a company with no car-making experience, arguing that such a move would lead to Kia's collapse and massive job losses. Samsung quickly fired back, accusing Daewoo of blocking the deal purely out of self-interest, aiming to stifle competition and secure a monopoly. The media soon ignited a war of words, and behind the scenes both sides continued to maneuver. Since the agreement between Samsung and Kia was only an indicative memorandum with further details yet to be negotiated, Daewoo still retained a chance to snatch Kia away.

Before these developments, the Korean automotive market was roughly divided among Hyundai, Daewoo, and Kia in a 4-2-2 ratio, accounting for over 80% of the market. It's not hard to see why Daewoo reacted so strongly. For Daewoo, a merger with Kia would have allowed it to rival Korea's largest automotive giant on an equal footing—with each capturing around 40% of the market. Conversely, losing Kia—or worse, if Hyundai acquired Kia—would have cost Daewoo any chance of competing with Hyundai.

In reality, Kim Woo-jung of Daewoo clearly failed to grasp the present situation in Korea. Politically, the recent general election on December 18, battered by the Asian financial crisis, saw the ruling party's popularity plummet, and Kim Dae-jung won the presidency without controversy. With elections no longer a constraint, and with President Kim Young-sam's term set to expire in just two months, the government had little reason to worry. Frankly, any decision regarding Kia that favored Kim Young-sam's party—or even his family—would be quickly embraced by the Blue House.

In contrast, Samsung Group was backed by the Westeros System and additional American political and economic forces, leaving no hesitation in its decision-making. Even if the Korean public knew little, the upper echelons of Korea's elite were well aware of America's substantial control over the nation. And although Kim Young-sam's party had suffered a loss this time, if it hoped to reclaim power in the next election, it would ultimately need American support—or at least must avoid provoking American opposition.

Moreover, what could Daewoo offer in return? Money, perhaps? Economically, whether due to Daewoo's internally troubled finances or because Chen Qing had already hinted at arrangements favoring the current authorities, it was clear that the government had no incentive to consider Daewoo's position. For politicians, these increasingly arrogant and unchecked chaebols had to be reined in—a few needed to be taken down as a warning to others.

Indeed, the day after Daewoo's press conference, on December 31, the Chosun Ilbo ran a special edition exposing that Daewoo Group's total debt had reached a staggering $70 billion. The report detailed how Daewoo's financial condition was precarious, on the verge of collapse—comparable to what had happened with Kia Motors and Hanbong Steel. Other media outlets quickly followed suit, plunging Daewoo into a media firestorm. Although in the past year the media had frequently highlighted the poor financial conditions of bankrupt conglomerates like Kia and Hanbong, a debt load as enormous as $70 billion was unprecedented. Had it not been for the deliberate collection and presentation of detailed evidence, the public might never have believed that Daewoo's debt could be so astronomical.

A hallmark of Korean conglomerates is their intricate, interwoven corporate structure. With a maze of debts among subsidiaries, even insiders can find it difficult to untangle the web. For the Korean public, the nation's recent hardships—and the forced agreements with the IMF—were seen as the inevitable result of these chaebols' unchecked borrowing. When the news broke, Daewoo, already simmering with pent-up anger, soon became the target of widespread condemnation. In response to the mounting media outrage, the IMF team stationed in Korea, which had remained relatively silent until now, unexpectedly issued a public statement, declaring that given Daewoo Group's severe financial risks, the IMF and its associated rescue capital would exercise extreme caution in any further funding. That was the final blow.

Under the dual pressure of the IMF's warning and the public outcry, on the last trading day of 1997, the stock prices of Daewoo Group's affiliated companies plummeted across the board, dragging down Korea's KOSPI index with a record 3.8% drop—the worst single-day decline since the IMF rescue agreement. The crisis in Korea—and indeed throughout Asia—was largely driven by a domino effect of panic, triggering one-sided short selling and capital flight much like a bank run. Now, that same panic had descended upon Daewoo Group, the latest target. For years, Korean chaebols had clung to the notion of "too big to fail." But having enjoyed smooth sailing for too long, these families gradually overlooked one critical point: "Too big to fail" does not mean an enterprise is invincible; rather, it means that to avoid enormous social fallout, governments will typically intervene to rescue them. In simpler terms, it's not that you can't collapse on your own—it's that the government's safety net prevents you from doing so. However, when the government is unwilling or unable to provide that net, a large chaebol's collapse is all but inevitable.

For Korea, the early part of 1997 had already witnessed the bankruptcies of giants like Hanbong and Kia, largely because the government, constrained by public sentiment and financial pressures, refused to bail them out. After the financial crisis swept Korea, the government found itself both unwilling and unable to provide a safety net. Now, it was Daewoo Group's turn. With no government bailout in sight—and with the IMF and international rescue capital not only unwilling to support Daewoo but actively cutting off aid—Daewoo Group's fate was sealed.

Time quickly advanced to January 1, 1998.

New Year's Day.

In a luxurious residence in Itaewon, Chen Qing finally returned around 1 a.m., still tipsy. That evening, she had attended a New Year's Eve party hosted by the newly elected President Kim Dae-jung. Although Kim Young-sam had also invited her, Chen Qing paid him no mind; she aligned herself solely with the victors. Moreover, the Kim Dae-jung camp had recently shown much more enthusiasm for the Westeros System than the ruling party had. The reason was simple: Kim Dae-jung needed a strong ally. Even though Kim Young-sam had once wrested power from the military government and established Korea's first civilian administration, he had inherited many of the old regime's structures and still maintained deep roots in the establishment. In contrast, the 73‑year‑old Kim Dae-jung, spending most of his time in opposition, later earned the nickname "the Mandela of Korea"—a fitting, though not entirely idealistic, moniker. Kim Dae-jung was acutely aware that the precarious coalition of minor parties that had propelled him to the presidency was unstable; a single misstep could see him sidelined by entrenched forces from the former ruling party. With only one term available to the Korean president, finding an immediate and tangible ally was crucial. It is easy to see why later Korean media would label Kim Dae-jung "America's lackey."

Yet, Kim Dae-jung was shrewd. While relying too closely on a massive ally like America could risk turning him into a puppet, the emergence of the Westeros System offered a timely alternative—one that, at the very least, he found appealing. In the months following his election, Kim Dae-jung quietly reached an understanding with the Westeros side. He planned to recommend a select few individuals to key positions in the next Blue House cabinet—positions not so prominent as to become easy targets, but crucial nonetheless. For example, one role might be deputy director of the Ministry of Information and Communication, responsible for Korea's telecommunications sector; another might be one of the five permanent voting members on the Korea Broadcasting Commission, tasked with formulating and supervising broadcasting policies. And so on.

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