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Chapter 1250 - Chapter 1250: We All Understand

The next day's secret negotiations shifted to Greenwich, Connecticut.

Chen Qing and James Rebold split up. James handled Hyundai and SK, while Chen Qing focused solely on Samsung, which her boss clearly valued more.

Because of thorough preparations, they reached a basic agreement in just one day.

Initially, Hyundai wanted the Westeros System's help to acquire Kia. James didn't hide anything and stated that Kia would be handed over to Samsung instead. However, he also promised that in the coming years, the Westeros System would assist Hyundai in swallowing up Daewoo, which was even larger in scale.

At first, Hyundai's Chung Mong-koo didn't believe it—until they showed him a series of financial data about Daewoo Group that even Hyundai had never uncovered.

Ranking second among Korean chaebols, Daewoo had a total debt across its businesses exceeding 70 billion dollars, with a debt-asset ratio of 470%, teetering on the edge of collapse at the slightest gust of wind. Over the next few years, the Westeros System would be fully capable of sending a few hurricanes Daewoo's way.

In truth, this was still a matter of "killing the chickens to scare the monkeys."

James's revelation was quite plain in its subtext: the Westeros System knew Daewoo's financial status inside and out, and it knew just as much about Hyundai. If Hyundai refused to cooperate, they wouldn't hesitate to unleash a few storms on Hyundai as well.

Things went much more smoothly with SK.

Aside from surrendering half the equity in one of its two core businesses—telecommunications—everything else the Westeros System offered was a plan for expansion, including pushing other chaebols to back off SK's second core area, petrochemicals, and helping SK fully acquire Hyundai's electronics business. Potentially, that could also include Daewoo's semiconductor division in the future.

Chen Qing's side likewise proceeded smoothly.

A promise of handing over Kia Motors alone made Lee Kun-hee soften. 

That was also due to the limited vision of Korean chaebols at this stage.

Before the crisis, out of the top ten Korean conglomerates, four—Hyundai, Daewoo, SsangYong, and Kia—had automobiles as their core business, which showed how big a share auto manufacturing held in the Korean economy. It also explained why Samsung had been pushing so hard into automobiles in recent years, no matter what.

They all considered it a great project.

Additionally, Chen Qing—on behalf of her boss—pledged that the Lee family would maintain long-term control of Samsung Group itself. Specifically, for the stake to be acquired in Samsung Electronics, there would be a scattered, multi-shell approach to holding shares. Even after the share transfer, all of Samsung Group's subsidiaries could still use their cross-shareholding structure to retain around 20% of Samsung Electronics' stock, thereby remaining the largest indirect shareholder. As part of that, the Lee family's stake would stay around 5%.

As for the auto business, the Westeros System would keep out entirely.

Lee Kun-hee well understood that this was the best deal he'd get: losing actual control over Samsung Electronics in exchange for a foothold in the automotive sector. He knew perfectly well that taking promises about "control" too literally would be naive, but he did believe that as long as he safeguarded the Westeros System's interests, Simon Westeros wouldn't arbitrarily strip the Lee family of their hold over Samsung Electronics.

Afterward, these three chaebol heads finally got to fly to Los Angeles to see Simon in person and sign a draft agreement.

At the follow-up reception, Simon promised again that if they cooperated smoothly, then in the future, Hyundai, Samsung, and SK would form a "Big Three" in Korea, while the others would fall to second-tier or even lower. Moreover, those three could claim a broader position in the global market.

No one knew how those three heads truly felt at heart.

They might also have wondered who would be on top, who would stand second, and who third.

Chen Qing did not accompany them to Los Angeles. Instead, she flew to Washington.

The IMF negotiating team about to head for Korea was being assembled. The Westeros System had planted its own people there long ago, so Chen Qing didn't need to worry about staffing; but she did need to get acquainted with them first so that communications would go smoothly when she traveled to Korea in secret later on.

…

Seoul, Korea.

In a blink, it was already Thursday, November 13 in Asia. It nearly coincided with "Black Friday," and the general mood in Korea was pretty much as if "Black Friday" had arrived.

At the Blue House (the presidential palace):

All day long, Kim Young-sam had been presiding over a meeting that would determine Korea's economic future.

The main agenda was whether Korea would confirm it was seeking IMF assistance.

Since Monday's revelation that Korea's foreign exchange reserves were almost exhausted, and since Tuesday's forced implementation of emergency currency controls and the temporary closure of the stock and bond markets, there had been an outpouring of outrage both at home and abroad. Numerous domestic media outlets were denouncing Kim Young-sam, calling on him to resign, while the matter of seeking IMF aid had again become the focal point of intense national debate.

Opposition came mainly from one of the three presidential candidates: Lee In-je.

He had once been a member of the ruling Grand National Party, but after losing the party's nomination to Lee Hoi-chang, he split off to form the "New National Party," whose support rate currently trailed only Kim Dae-jung and Lee Hoi-chang. He had around 20% of voter support.

Twenty percent was just half of what the two leading candidates had. Under normal circumstances, he couldn't win. Now he seized upon this crisis as a chance to take a sharp turn.

Lee In-je's view: Since Korea had already imposed foreign exchange controls and closed the stock and bond markets, it should maintain that stance—there was no need to concede the nation's economic sovereignty by going to the IMF. Instead, Korea should do an internally managed cleanup of bad corporations and international debts under government oversight, while negotiating with creditors to extend repayment deadlines.

In recent days, Lee In-je had been aggressively pushing this stance in the media, attracting sympathetic voices and boosting his support rate to over 25%.

But how could it be so simple?

At the root, Lee In-je's plan was simply defaulting.

Essentially, "I can't pay back right now, so you must give me more time to sort out my assets. I'll pay gradually. Or if you want me to repay sooner, you'll have to let me pay less."

To back his stance, Lee had repeatedly blasted foreign financial speculators, telling citizens that these predators caused the crisis—thus the overseas capital now stuck in Korea's debt market bore much blame for Korea's current mess.

Frankly, Lee In-je wasn't entirely wrong.

But right or wrong was never the deciding factor in the real world.

On Wednesday, in response to Korea's renewed dithering after it had indicated it would approach the IMF for help, Standard & Poor's directly downgraded the country's sovereign credit rating from BB+ (general risk) to CCC- (very poor, likely to default)—junk bond status.

Not only that, but the US, Japan, and the EU expressed "close concern" about Korea's subsequent moves under its emergency financial controls.

A short-term freeze might be forgivable if reversed promptly.

But if Korea intended to keep "lying down," refusing to pay the price of turning to the IMF, in order to prevent the financial market from collapsing further, then the Western powers might impose sanctions on the grounds that Korea was gravely undermining international financial order.

They'd be done for.

In a Blue House meeting room:

They'd spent the day sparring with words. Lee In-je remained obdurate, and Kim Young-sam was on the verge of hurling his teacup at the man's face—perhaps culminating in a fistfight.

In truth, the Blue House possessed full authority to bypass Lee In-je and go straight to the IMF.

But the IMF wasn't willing to accept that.

Korea's general election was approaching. To ensure any IMF-Korea agreement would remain valid, Washington demanded that the current President, Kim Young-sam, plus the top three presidential candidates sign the deal together. Even if Lee In-je's support was weaker, as events of recent days had shown, a "black swan" could still appear. No one could risk the possibility that if Lee In-je won, he might renounce the IMF's multi-billion-dollar loan agreement.

Evening approached, and another day was slipping by. Kim Young-sam knew they had no time to stall. He refused to adjourn, letting the sun set behind them and the conference room lights turn on.

No dinner, either.

Lee In-je and his camp also acted implacable.

Around seven o'clock that night, the Blue House's Chief Secretary, Kang Hyun-ho, arrived with a stack of documents and whispered something to Kim Young-sam. Kim nodded and cleared the room of everyone irrelevant, leaving only himself and the three leading presidential candidates. He pushed the file in front of Lee In-je. "Take a look, In-je. Whatever decision you make after seeing these, tonight, I'm sending an invitation to the IMF to come to Korea."

Without meeting Kim Young-sam's gaze, Lee In-je hesitated but opened the top file.

It was the asset-liability data for Korea's ten largest banks.

Clearly simplified to be easily grasped at a glance.

Lee In-je skimmed just over half before stopping, looking up in disbelief at Kim. "Impossible. This can't be real. It must be fake."

He'd seen five or six banks so far. The lowest bad-debt ratio was 79%, the highest reaching 263%.

His entire basis for refusing an IMF rescue was the idea that Korea still had enough assets to carry out internal reform. But the shocking bad-debt ratios of the top ten banks were completely unexpected—even the lowest was 79%. The highest…

No. 

He snatched out one page and waved it at Kim Young-sam. "Do you take me for a fool? Seoul Bank—263% in bad debts? How can it exceed 100%?"

Kim Dae-jung, seated on the other side, was also curious.

They were all trying to talk sense into this stubborn donkey. If they produced phony numbers, it would just make matters worse.

Kim Dae-jung didn't know too much about finance, either.

Kim Young-sam's face was grim. "Maybe if you read more carefully, you'd see the extra amount comes from external debt." 

Irritated, he went on: "They counted short-term overseas financing that doesn't belong to the bank's own capital, then turned around and lent it out as long-term loans. Now so many companies are bankrupt or near it, so they can't recoup the money. And this is only the beginning. If the economy doesn't get aid soon, it'll keep deteriorating. Of the ten biggest banks in your hand, we might not be able to save half of them. We simply don't have the resources you imagine for reviving our economy. External rescue is our only option."

Korea's external debts topped 200 billion dollars, but in total, domestic plus foreign debt—at the pre-crisis 800 won/dollar rate—exceeded 500 billion. 

Over 90% of that debt came from Korea's ten leading banks, covering domestic loans as well as foreign loans. That portion funded by internal capital was effectively the wealth Korea had built up over decades.

Now, merely through the fall of the won, that 300-billion chunk of assets held by Korean banks had been cut in half. Looking forward, as countless companies went bankrupt, restructured, or reorganized, who knew how much of that huge sum would remain?

This was basically how financial crises severely drain national strength.

Currency devaluation, debt meltdown, stock market collapse… and in the end, decades of accumulated wealth vanish overnight.

Put simply, Korea's only remaining path was to seek outside aid.

They could close off and default, sure, but that led nowhere—would be suicide. Because the US and other Western countries had already declared that if Korea dared to blatantly sabotage the global financial system, it would never recover.

After hearing Kim's explanation, Lee In-je silently placed that page back and set aside the file on Korea's banks. He turned to the next folder.

He nearly leapt up again.

Inside was a thick sheaf of handwritten letters.

In simple terms, they were threats.

Core members of his New National Party wrote to say that if, in the name of party maneuvering, he acted against the national interest, they would join forces and kick him out.

Then there were letters from the heads of each chaebol. The overall meaning was the same: if he refused to cooperate with the IMF rescue negotiations, he shouldn't expect a single won of political funding from them anymore.

Reading all that, he realized his cause was lost.

What gave Lee In-je the confidence to stand against both the sitting president and the other two main candidates was not just popular support but also his belief he had allies in politics and business who might stand with him. With enough leverage, maybe he could pull off an upset in the presidential race.

He did indeed find backers in the political realm.

But as for the chaebols, he'd vastly overestimated their resolve. Every head among the top ten had taken a stand in these letters.

With that, persisting would mean the end of his political career.

After a moment's silence, he finally spoke: "I'll sign—but I need some assurances."

They'd wasted three full days dealing with his obstruction. Kim Young-sam knew he ought to rein in his temper, but ultimately he failed. With a sneer, he retorted, "We can give you assurances, but do you really think they'll be fulfilled?"

Sure enough, Kim's remark put Lee In-je in an awkward spot. He didn't go back on what he'd just said. Instead, he abruptly stood and strode for the door.

With one foot out, he turned and cast his gaze around at the other three by the large conference table. His voice was bitter: "We all know it. We are about to sell out our country. We… are all sinners of the Republic of Korea."

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